International

No solution in sight: The state of transitionist vs tranformationist debate in the post-Benazir Pakistan

      by Arif Azad

 Pakistan's never-ending oscillation between military dictatorships and hamstrung democratic governments has been a subject of great fascination and heart-burning in equal measures. In the rest of the world, there is a clear line dividing dictatorships and democracy. Military dictators are taken to task for their constitutional and human rights deviations when they exit from power, either under domestic or external pressures. General Augusto Pinochet, then formidable dictator of Chile, is a leading example in this regard. Alongside political movements seeking the exit of dictatorships, there has surfaced a large body of literature that analyses and charts the ill-effects of military rules.

Writers like Augusto Roa Bastos, Alijendro Carpentier, Mario Vargo and Gabriel Garcia Marquez have written a number of novels that have come to be known as 'dictatorship novels' -- a new genre in countries blighted by the curse of dictatorships. In all these works, a clear repulsion is voiced against military dictatorships, banana republics and the larger-than-life-cults of leaders. As a result of such robust resistance from civil society and intellectuals, many of Latin and South American countries have emerged out of the long years of dictatorships and are back on the path of democracy. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be happening in Pakistan. Debates in the country on the issue of civil and military relations are being muddied with each passing day, leaving more heat and fury than illumination.

One illustration of this trend is manifested in the debate that recently bubbled in some newspapers and magazines between transitionists and transformationists. The former contend that political parties need to engage with the army in a collaborative relation to prepare the ground for transition to democracy. The latter, on the other hand, believe that the army itself is the biggest obstacle in preparing the ground for transition to democracy. They, therefore argue that unless the political parties adopt a confrontational stance against the army, the chances of a genuine democratic process taking its course in Pakistan is minimal.

It is also important to note that the debate between the transitionists and the transformationists was framed just ahead of the forthcoming general elections. Prior to the elections, there was a slow build up of Western pressure on President General Pervez Musharraf to accommodate more inclusive, liberal and moderate elements in the next government. This line of thinking was also advocated regularly in these newspapers and magazines.

In most of these narratives, Musharraf was portrayed as the liberal reformer who had somehow sleepwalked into the embrace of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA).

For Pakistan to remain under his 'soft dictatorship', it was proposed repeatedly, Musharraf should seek out his allies among the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). Strangely, nowhere in these editorials and op-ed pieces was the criticism of the military, fast entrenching itself into every nook and cranny of the national life, mounted as a matter of democratic conviction. With the passage of time, this became the accepted wisdom in policy and political circles.

To the surprise of many, the late Benazir Bhutto fell for this line and began feeling out the military-led government to find terms of compromise. A widely unpopular deal with Musharraf was struck, leading to her return on October 18, 2007. For a time, it looked things were going the transitionist way; the PPP, the country's most popular political party had accepted the realist position and come to an understanding with the military ruler, as desired by the transitionists.

From then on, every political move began to be read under the over-arching theme of transitionist / transformantionist binary. The biggest problem with the transitionist argument was that it was conceding too much to Musharraf in terms of his inherent willingness to restore democracy and share power with the civilian government.

The optimism of the transitionists ran against the tenor of Pakistani politics; where the military rulers have always looked down upon the politicians and refused even to offer a nod in the direction of transferring power. More worryingly, the transitionists seemed to lay the entire onus of the transition business on the politicians, who were required to carry the burden of bringing democracy to Pakistan, without corresponding obligations on the military to begin to cede power to the elected government.

These problems in the transitionist argument were fatally exposed when

Musharraf declared emergency on November 3, 2007. At a stroke, the steps envisaged in the transitionist camp were reversed. Another tear appeared when Benazir was assassinated on December 27, 2007. As the widespread suspicion of eliminating the most progressive and moderate politician of the country fell on the establishment, the notion of the establishment sharing power with the moderate progressive elements also suffered an irreparable blow. A few weeks later, Musharraf further muddied the transition debate by asserting that Benazir was unacceptable to the military.

Where do all these developments leave the transitionist camp? There is not much steam left in their argument as a result of various actions taken by Musharraf since November 3, 2007. The house of cards, upon which transitionist camp had built its case, has collapsed; and the transformationist camp seems to have won at least for the time being, as evidenced in the falling popularity of Muhsharraf. In the long term, only a democratic government can provide solutions to the multi-layered problems being faced by the nation today.

With every new military regime, a whole set of new problems are created to prolong the dictatorial rule, but the long term damage done to the country's capacity to absorb these shocks further undermines its flawed progress to democracy. In today's Pakistan, social and political contradictions have reached such an unprecedented level that the time-frame and the unexpected outbreak of assumed regard for democracy in the establishment may be a case of too little, too late.

In this regard, Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani's recent announcement to recall all armed forces' personnel working in civilian departments is a step in the right direction. This is hardly an endorsement for the transitionist position, though. Unless there is a genuine desire in the top brass of the army to hand over power when a new civilian government is formed after the elections, Pakistan's journey towards stability will remain as elusive as it has been so far.